The standard semantics for counterfactuals ensures that any counterfactual with a true antecedent and true consequent is itself true. There have been many recent attempts to amend the standard semantics to avoid this result. I show that these proposals invalidate a number of further principles of the standard logic of counterfactuals. The case against the automatic truth of counterfactuals with true components does not extend to these further principles, however, so it is not clear that rejecting the latter should be a consequence of rejecting the former. Instead I consider how one might defuse putative counterexamples to the truth of true-true counterfactuals.
(1) is true on the standard account since it follows from Conjunction Conditionalization -at least one head did come up and I did win. McDermott claims, however, that intuitively (1) is false and so Conjunction Conditionalization is invalid. McDermott concludes that the standard semanticsin particular the combination of (i) and Strong Centring -is to be rejected.
Weak Centring
The alleged invalidity of Conjunction Conditionalization has led to the development of rival possible world semantics which lack this consequence. In order to avoid Conjunction Conditionalization, Lewis (1986: 22) himself considers amending the standard semantics by replacing Strong Centring with Weak Centring: Any world is amongst the most similar worlds to itself, whilst maintaining (i) and (ii). Bennett (1974: 387) claims that this manoeuvre is ineffective since no world can be as similar to w as w itself is. Cogburn and Roland (2013: 252), McGlynn (2012: 277) , and Penczek (1997: 80-81) agree. Given that these authors all wish to maintain Modus Ponens which, given (i), is secured by Weak Centring, these authors conclude that the core of the standard semantics, (i), is to be rejected. In the light of this result, they then provide their own possible world semantics which invalidate Conjunction Conditionalization.
Bennett's thought above, however, is incorrect. Although Strong Centring might be nonnegotiable given some intuitive, but not purely qualitative, notion of similarity, Lewis (1979) and Stalnaker (1987) admit, in response to objections from Bennett (1974) and Fine (1975) , that similarity here is a technical notion and not what we might think of as intuitive overall similarity.
i As Stalnaker puts it, Bennett's and Fine's objections "show decisively that the intuitive notion of overall similarity between possible worlds ... is not the [notion] that is relevant to the interpretation of counterfactual conditionals " (1987: 127) . Moreover, such "[a]n account of the respects of similarity that are relevant to selection [of possible worlds] might say that some respects of similarity count for nothing at all, and so should be ignored" (Stalnaker 1987: 128) .
Such a measure may nevertheless be a relation of overall similarity -not because it is likely to guide our explicit judgments of similarity, but rather because it is a resultant, under some system of weights or priorities, of a multitude of relations of similarity in particular respects (Lewis 1979: 43) .
As a result, it is not clear that a world is more similar to itself than any other world is. So, given iii McDermott (2007: 334) , noting the failure of Bennett's objection, argues that nevertheless the combination of (i) and Weak Centring is not an option for those who reject (1). McDermott's case against this package can be put as follows. In McDermott's scenario described above, as well as rejecting (1), McDermott also endorses (2) If I had bet on two heads, two heads would have come up, just as we endorse (3) If I had not bet on two heads, two heads would have come up.
(3) is an 'irrelevant semifactual': it is a semifactual (a counterfactual with a true consequent and false antecedent) where the obtaining of the antecedent is irrelevant to the obtaining of the consequent. And it is a commitment of our thinking about counterfactuals that such irrelevant semifactuals are true. The reason for this is that when considering counterfactuals we hold fixed the effects of causal chains that are independent of the obtaining of the antecedent. So given that two heads came up and that the result of the coin toss is independent of my betting behaviour, (3) is true. Similar reasoning supports (2).
Some, like Phillips (2007) , would reject this line of thinking since they reject that irrelevant semifactuals are true in indeterministic contexts. Nevertheless, this line of thinking is widely accepted by advocates and critics of Conjunction Conditionalization alike (Bennett 2003 : §9, Edgington 2004 , Kvart 1986 , McDermott 2007 , Noordhof 2004 , Pollock 1976 : 26, Schaffer 2004 , and Walters 2009 . Moreover, Lewis (1979: 48 -see his discussion of Morgenbesser's coin) accepts the truth of irrelevant semifactuals, as do Cogburn and Roland (2013), McGlynn 6 (2012), and, more tentatively, Penczek (1997) . So these authors would accept (2). In any case, we can stipulate that we are to think of McDermott's situation as deterministic. In such a context, (2) seems secure.
Now if Lewis's retreat from Strong Centring to merely Weak Centring is to account for the falsity of (1), some world, w*, at which only one head comes up and I lose (that is, where I don't bet on exactly one head coming up) must be as close to the actual world, @, as @ is to itself. In particular w* is a world where I still bet on two heads. That is, what in part underwrites the intuitive falsity of (1) is (4) If at least one head had come up, I would have bet two heads.
Moreover, that (4) is true can be seen by noting that it is an irrelevant semifactual: I did bet two heads and my betting behaviour is independent of the result of the coin toss.
So w* is a world where I bet on two heads (from (4)), and also a world where only one head comes up (from the falsity of (1)). But as w* is as close to @ as @ is, w* is sufficient to make (2) false given (i). So, given the truth of (2), the falsity of (1) cannot be accommodated by maintaining both (i) and Weak Centring. Now (i) only validates Modus Ponens in conjunction with Weak Centring, so (i) has to be rejected if Modus Ponens is to be upheld. The possible world semanticist, then, will have to look elsewhere to accommodate failures of Conjunction
Conditionalization. In §4- §7 I consider some alternative proposals. But first, let's examine some further consequences of the standard account.
The Logic of Counterfactuals
As well as Conjunction Conditionalization, the standard logic of counterfactuals validates the principles below. Indeed, if we remove Conjunction Conditionalization from the axiomatization of Lewis's official system, VC, we have a weaker logic, VW, which validates the principles below without also validating the allegedly problematic Conjunction Conditionalization
As we shall see, the four accounts discussed below do not validate VW in virtue of not validating all of the above principles. But the accounts discussed below are attempts to conservatively revise the standard semantics. So, to the extent that they invalidate some of the above principles, they fail in this respect. Further, with the exception of Gundersen on Modus Ponens, none of the authors discussed below note that their semantics invalidate some of the above principles, let alone provide arguments that the above principles are invalid. So, for all these authors have said, their semantics and the logics they validate are undermotivated.
The above notes a failure in the argumentative strategy of the authors who reject Conjunction
Conditionalization, but this is not to say that the theorems of VW listed above are valid. So what can be said in their favour? Well, we should note that many who wish to reject Conjunction
Conditionalization will wish to retain the above attractive looking principles, and so the semantics considered below will be unacceptable to them. iv Further, although the above principles are theorems of the standard possible world semantics, supplemented with Weak
Centring, these principles are not tied to such a semantics. For instance, these principles are validated by Pollock's (1976: 42-43 ) cotenability semantics and Gärdenfors (1978) belief revision semantics, and they correspond to analogous claims about probabilistic entailment on Adams' (1975: 61) probabilistic account.
It is, however, difficult to provide a full defence of these principles as no appeal to examples can establish the validity of a theorem. And it is hard to know what to say to someone who does not find the above principles compelling; at some point we reach bedrock, and can only point to the plausibility of principles. I take it, however, that the first three principles are extremely intuitive and that most who reject Conjunction Conditionalization will want to do so without going to the extremes of rejecting these principles. For example, it is very difficult to see how Agglomeration could be false. Isn't it obvious that the truth of 'if I had gone to the party, Jasmine would have left' and 'if I had gone to the party, Priya would have left' licenses the claim that if I had gone to the party, Jasmine and Priya would have left? With the exception of McGlynn, all of the authors below invalidate at least one of these three principles.
The two principles concerning disjunctive antecedents also seem compelling. Burgess (1981: 77) and Pollock (1976: 42-43) have Disjunction as an axiom, and Pruss, a critic of the standard account, also accepts Disjunction arguing that since the subjunctive conditional says what would happen were some condition realized … if some proposition would hold under one condition and would also hold under another condition, then it is hard to deny that it would hold under the disjunction of these two conditions (Pruss 2007: 33-34) .
Apart from agreeing with these philosophers we should note that one reason for rejecting Disjunction does not undermine our arguments against the accounts below. Disjunction is suspect, one may think, because one way in which A v B can be true is when A ∧ B is true. So instead of endorsing Disjunction, one may only be prepared to endorse Ahmed (2011 ), Tichý (1978 , and Tooley (2002) .
vi Nevertheless, we should note that Burgess (1981: 77) and Pollock (1976: 42-43) 
But Transitivity often looks very good, as it seems to underlie arguments like the following (7) If you had jumped from the roof, you would have broken some bones.
(8) If you had broken some bones, you would have been in pain.
(9) Therefore, if you had jumped from the roof, you would have been in pain.
The problem with Transitivity is that it also seems subject to counterexamples such as the following (10) If Smith had died, Jones would have stopped campaigning.
(11) If Jones had stopped campaigning, Smith would have won the election.
(12) Therefore, if Smith had died, Smith would have won the election! Whilst (10) and (11) could well be true, (12) seems false, and so Transitivity is, it appears, invalid. Stalnaker and Lewis take the counterexamples to Transitivity at face value, as, it seems, do the authors discussed below.
x But this means that such authors cannot appeal to Transitivity when explaining the seeming validity of (7)- (9). Instead, Stalnaker and Lewis note that although Transitivity is not valid, Limited Transitivity is. Moreover, instances of Transitivity seem compelling only when we are prepared to strengthen the antecedent of the second premise so as to deliver an argument which is an instance of Limited Transitivity. So, the thought goes, it is Limited Transitivity that underwrites (7)- (9), not Transitivity.
To see how this works, consider the required strengthening of the second premises of the instances of Transitivity above. In the first argument we are prepared to accept the conclusion because we are prepared to strengthen (8) to (13) If you had jumped from the roof and broken some bones, you would have been in pain.
As a result we have, given Limited Transitivity, a sound argument from (7) and (13) to (9). In the second argument, however, we are not prepared to accept the conclusion. The diagnosis is that in this case we are not prepared to strengthen (11) to (14) If Smith had died and Jones had stopped campaigning, Smith would have won the election.
In the envisaged scenario, (14) is false, and so Limited Transitivity does not license the conclusion (12). So whereas Stalnaker and Lewis can explain why the good instances of Transitivity seem good, and why the bad instances of Transitivity seem bad, the authors below cannot as the explanation crucially rests on the validity of Limited Transitivity which they fail to secure.
In what follows I show that all of the accounts below invalidate Limited Transitivity, SDA*, and Disjunction*, as well as each being subject to at least one further difficulty. Such attempts to invalidate Conjunction Conditionalization, then, will not hold universal appeal.
Penczek
A natural first thought about counterfactuals is that their truth requires some sort of connection between the antecedent and the consequent. Moreover, many opponents of Conjunction Conditionalization including Bennett (1974, pp. 386-388) , Fine (1975, p. 453), and Bigelow (1976, p. 218 would secure the truth of subjunctive conditionals with true but unconnected antecedents and consequents, it should be reckoned invalid, the critics maintain, for exactly this reason (Butcher 1983: 71) .
Penczek seems to endorse this objection to Conjunction Conditionalization when he writes that many putative counterexamples to Conjunction Conditionalization exploit the fact that counterfactual statements, in virtue of their form, suggest a certain sort of connection (often, but not always, a causal connection) between antecedent and consequent, while in fact this connection may be lacking. That counterfactuals with true components should automatically be true might thus be considered a weakness in Lewis's account (Penczek 1997: 80) .
Penczek concludes from this that the mere truth of A and C should not count in favour of A → C. As a result, Penczek suggests that when assessing A → C we should consider situations in which A and C are both false. To see how Penczek does this, let's introduce a two-place connective, >, so that A > C has the truth conditions that the standard account attributes to A → C. We then use A > C to provide Penczek's semantics for counterfactuals:
A → C is true at a world w iff either: When A and C are false, (c) is redundant, given that > obeys modus ponens, and so Penczek's truth condition matches the standard account's. But when at least one of A or C are true, we have to go to the closest (~A ∧ ~C)-worlds, and assess whether or not A > C is true there, as well being true at the world of evaluation. As a result, Penczek's account predicts that (1) is false just as the opponent of Conjunction Conditionalization wants it to be. In particular, condition (c) is not met: in the closest worlds in which no heads come up and I lose the bet, 'at least one head > I win' is false, since amongst the closest worlds where at least one heads comes up will be worlds where I still bet two heads and only one heads comes up.
There is, however, a general challenge to those, like Penczek, who endorse the Connection Hypothesis, namely that it seems to be false for reasons independent of Conjunction Conditionalization. In particular, the Connection Hypothesis cannot account for the truth of irrelevant semifactuals such as (3) (Nute 1980: 7) . This is because, although the Connection Hypothesis allows 'if I were to push the button, the doorbell would ring' to be true in suitable circumstances, it does not allow 'if I were to push the button, the doorbell would exist' to be true in those same circumstances, even though the doorbell's ringing entails that the doorbell exists (∃x x=the doorbell).
Returning to Penczek's semantics, we can illustrate the failure of Weakening the Consequent with the following model of worlds and propositions true at them (in this and the models that follow, W1 is the world of evaluation) -W1: (A ∧ B ∧ C); W2: (~A ∧ ~B ∧ C); W3: (~A ∧ ~B A → B turns on the truth of (~A ∧ ~B) > (A > B). This is true in our model assuming that W2 is the closest (~A ∧ ~B)-world to W1 and W1 is the closest A-world to W2. And B entails C, since all the B-worlds are C-worlds. But A → C need not be true in this model, since (~A ∧ ~C) > (A > C) is false when W4 is amongst the closest A-worlds to W3. As a result a result Weakening the Consequent is invalid.
Penczek's proposal also invalidates Agglomeration as the following countermodel shows. W1: We should note that the above countermodels respect the following constraints that Lewis (1971) imposes on the closeness ordering: Of course, that Constraints 3 and 4 are of no help does not show that there is no constraint which delivers the appropriate logic. But if Penczek holds on to the Connection Hypothesis, then not only will his account give the incorrect verdict on irrelevant semifactuals, Weakening the Consequent will also be invalidated as we have seen.
In the light of the difficulties above, Penczek's account it is to be rejected, in its current form at least. (For the same reason we should also reject Bigelow's (1976) similar account: A → C is true at w iff A > C is true throughout some sphere of worlds around w which includes a (~A ∧ ~C)-world). As we noted, Penczek (1997: 84 n12) was alive to the problem of semifactuals, and although he doesn't explicitly address it, he notes that perhaps his truth condition could be modified to allow for irrelevant semifactuals such as (3) to be true. It is to such a modification that we now turn.
McGlynn
McGlynn (2012) Of course, this does not show that there is no constraint which delivers the appropriate logic. But given McGlynn's other commitments we have good reason to think that no such constraint will be forthcoming. Consider the countermodel to Disjunction* above. Let us add that in W1, C is overdetermined by two independent indeterministic causes, A and B. Given this set up the closest ~A-world to W1 will be W2. This is because whether or not A obtains is irrelevant to the causal chain between B and C, and so we hold the result of this causal chain fixed when considering ~A. By parallel reasoning W3 is the closest ~B-world to W1. Cogburn and Roland (2013: 257) , motivated by problems with Sosa's counterfactual account of safe belief, provide an alternative semantics for counterfactuals which avoids Conjunction
Cogburn and Roland
Conditionalization. xvi Their proposal is that:
A → C is non-vacuously true in a context C and a world w iff most of the (C,w)-relevantly similar A-worlds are C-worlds. Although it avoids Conjunction Conditionalization, Cogburn and Roland's proposal is manifestly flawed. To start with, Cogburn and Roland's specific proposal has two obvious problems. First, rather than 'most', Cogburn and Roland would do better to opt for 'at least n%', for some large n (cf. Bennett, 2003: §98) . This is because, if I do not toss a biased coin which comes up heads 51% of the time, we do not want to endorse 'if I had tossed the coin, it would have come up heads' even though most of the relevant worlds in which it is tossed, are ones in which it lands heads.
Second, Cogburn and Roland's proposal invalidates Modus Ponens (cf. Bennett, 2003: 250) .
That n% of (C,w)-similar A-worlds are C-worlds does not preclude the actual world being an (A It is easy enough to amend Cogburn and Roland's proposal in the light of the above problems, however, and some of their remarks suggest the way that they would go:
A → C is non-vacuously true in a context C and a world w iff at least n% of (C,w)-relevantly similar A-worlds are C-worlds and all very close (C,w)-relevantly similar Aworlds are C-worlds.
If we add to this truth condition that the actual world is always one of the very close (C,w)-relevantly similar A-worlds for any true A, Modus Ponens is restored. → C will be true, but neither of A → C or B → C will be, thus invalidating SDA*.
So, like the accounts above, Cogburn and Roland invalidate Limited Transitivity, SDA*, and Disjunction*, and in addition they also invalidate Agglomeration. This seems like a large cost just to avoid Conjunction Conditionalization.
Gundersen
Gundersen (2004) rejects Conjunction Conditionalization for reasons along the lines of the Connection Hypothesis. What he thinks is important for A → C is that all 'normal' A-worlds be C-worlds. And the type of normality or connection that he thinks is important is probability raising. So, for Gundersen, A → C is true iff both of the following are satisfied:
(16) P(C/A) is greater than P(~C/A) (17) P(C/A) is greater than P(C/~A) xxi As we noted above ( §4), those who endorse the Connection Hypothesis face a general challenge, namely that irrelevant semifactuals seem to provide a counterexample, and relatedly, that the Connection Hypothesis violates Weakening the Consequent. Gundersen's response is to distinguish between genuine counterfactuals and subjunctives with true antecedents on the one hand, and semifactuals on the other. For Gundersen, the former types of conditional assert a connection between the antecedent and the consequent, and are to be treated by his clause for A → C above. On the other hand, Gundersen claims that semifactuals assert the lack of the opposite connection. That is, a semifactual 'if A were the case, C would have been the case' is treated by Gundersen not as A → C, but rather as ~(A → ~C). As a result Gundersen need not reject the truth of irrelevant semifactuals, nor does his account invalidate Weakening the Consequent on the grounds that Penczek's account does. xxii Nevertheless, Gundersen's account is not without its problems.
Given that P(C/A)=n says that the proportion of the relevant A-cases that are C-cases is n, the logic that Gundersen's semantics validates shares certain features with the logic of Cogburn and
Roland's account. In particular, neither Modus Ponens nor Agglomeration is validated.
Gundersen is aware of the former and takes this to be a virtue of his account, since w can be abnormal, for instance by being an (A ∧ ~C)-world when A almost invariably brings about C.
For Gundersen this latter fact makes A → C true at w. Whatever the merits of dropping Modus Ponens, invalidating Agglomeration seems like a large cost.
Leaving to one side Modus Ponens and Agglomeration, Gundersen's account faces further problems. First, Gundersen has failed to provide an account of subjunctives with necessary antecedents, since P(C/~A) is undefined when A is necessary.
Second, Gundersen's semantics has further unpalatable consequences for the logic of conditionals as it invalidates Disjunction, SDA*, and Limited Transitivity in essentially the same way as Cogburn and Roland's does since P(C/A) is greater than P(~C/A) iff most of the Aworlds are C worlds. But in addition, Gundersen's account also invalidates Weakening the Consequent. This is because when B entails C, the following claims are consistent: P(C/A) is P(C/A) is not greater than P(C/~A). This is because all of the ~A-worlds could be C-worlds, but only a few of them be B-worlds.
Gundersen emphasises that he is proposing an amendment of the standard account (2004: 3) and (2004: 18) that there is "a considerable degree of agreement" between his theory and Lewis's.
Here I have highlighted the differences between the two theories and I take this to count against Gundersen.
xxiii
Lessons
We have seen that the above proposals for invalidating Conjunction Conditionalization have wider consequences for the logic of counterfactuals. Moreover, although they are within the spirit of the standard approach, the resulting logic is importantly different. There is, then, a general lesson that the above attempts to circumvent Conjunction Conditionalization remind us of. One cannot simply take a semantics, S, which validates a logic, L, a theorem of which is P, and amend S to some S* which does not validate P, so that S* validates the logic that results from subtracting P from L.
There is, in addition, a more localized lesson. Penczek's and McGlynn's accounts mishandle counterfactuals with complex antecedents because they, in effect, make the truth of a counterfactual an antecedent-relative matter. On the standard account, antecedents determine that we are concerned only with worlds where the antecedent holds true but that is their only role in determining [the] selection [of worlds]. The rest of the job is done by some antecedent-independent conception of similarity or minimal difference (Stalnaker, 1987: 129-130 S's belief that P is safe iff in most relevant worlds where S believes P (SBP), P, and in all very close relevant worlds where SBP, P.
More generally, we can specify an account of safe belief without committing to any claim about the semantics of counterfactuals: if we think T gives the truth conditions of SBP → P, rather than saying SBP is safe iff SBP → P, we can say instead that SBP is safe iff T, cutting out the claim about the semantics of counterfactuals. In McGlynn's terms, we can say that SBP is safe iff ~SBP > (SBP > P). And what goes for safe belief goes for sensitive belief too. Formulating safety and sensitivity in terms of natural language counterfactuals adds nothing to a theory of knowledge, is unnecessarily committal, and so is hostage to the kind of issues we've been discussing above. This is particularly clear in the case of Cogburn and Roland, as their proposal simply grafts an implausible semantics for counterfactuals onto something like Pritchard's account of safe belief. Rather than amending the semantics of counterfactuals to make them suitable for epistemology, epistemologists should simply pick another tool for the job. Of course, whether safety and sensitivity are useful in epistemology is another question. But whether they are, or are not, does not turn on making substantial claims about natural language semantics.
Revisiting the Problem
We have seen that a range of possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals which invalidate Conjunction Conditionalization have interesting consequences that many will take to show their inadequacy. Given the difficulties with invalidating Conjunction Conditionalization within a logically conservative possible world semantics, perhaps we should abandon thinking of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds (cf. Fine 2012). Alternatively, we could re-examine our reasons for rejecting Conjunction Conditionalization in the first place.
We can recognize the validity of Conjunction Conditionalization, whilst at the same time accepting that not all counterfactuals with true components are assertable. Gundersen (2004: 3) claims that "counterfactuals are associated with a pragmatic implicature: one ought to assert them when their ... antecedent as a matter of fact is false. Or, at least one should only assert them when one, for whatever reasons, takes the antecedent to be false". xxvi This isn't quite right, If Conjunction Conditionalization is valid, then A ∧ C is strictly stronger than A → C. As a result, we should, by Grice's maximum of quantity, ceteris paribus assert A ∧ C, if we know it, rather than the weaker A → C. Of course, some counterfactuals with true components are assertable even when the truth of A ∧ C is known, but given that A ∧ C is strictly stronger than A → C, there must be some reason to assert the weaker A → C. I suggest that if A → C is assertable when A ∧ C is known, it is because we are not relying on the truth of the antecedent for the truth of the counterfactual so that the conditional is true regardless of the truth of A. In particular, when A → C is assertable in such cases, ~A > (A > C) is true as well. So an assertion of A → C conversationally implies or otherwise suggests ~A > (A > C). But when ~A > (A > C) is false, as it is in the problematic instances of Conjunction Conditionalization, A → C is not assertable. On the other hand, if we do not know that A, then in the disputed instances of worlds are a subset of the closest (A v B)-worlds all of which are ~C-worlds. In the standard semantics the closeness relation is constrained in such a way as to rule out such countermodels (see Constraints 1 and 2). vi I lack the space to discuss them here, although see Walters (2011) for a reply to Ahmed. vii Assuming a weak background logic of counterfactuals and the principle (X → ⊥) ⊃ ∼X. viii Fine (2012) argues that given some plausible non-logical assumptions, one cannot maintain Limited Transitivity, substitution of logical equivalents in the antecedents of counterfactuals, Disjunction, an infinitary version of Agglomeration, and the fact that counterfactuals whose antecedents entail their consequents are true. One could take Fine's argument as a reductio of Limited Transitivity, but obviously this is not the only option. ix Gundersen (2004: 18) notes this. Cogburn and Roland (2013) explicitly design a semantics for which contraposition fails, and as a result it also invalidates Transitivity. Penczek's (1997) If W3 is amongst the closest A-worlds to W2 then although A → B is true, A → C is not. And this is consistent with (B ⊃ C) if W3 is inaccessible from W1, which it can be unless the accessibility relation is transitive. xv Bennett (2003: 241) , who rejects Conjunction Conditionalization, in effect endorses McGlynn's semantics.
Bennett claims that if A and C are both true at w then A → C is true at w just in case it is true at the closest ~A-worlds to w. Bennett also endorses Constraint 5: "Given that w is α's closest ~A-world, presumably α is w's closest A-world". But as we have just shown, with Constraint 5 in place McGlynn's semantics validates Conjunction Conditionalization. In Bennett's terms, if w is the closest ~A-world to α, then A → C is true at w, since the closest A-world to w is α which is an (A∧C)-world. Given that A → C is true at w, the closest ~A-world to α, it is also true at α. Generalizing, we have the validity of Conjunction Conditionalization. Thanks here to Charlie Temperley for reminding me of Bennett's discussion. xvi McGlynn (2012: 284) and Gundersen (2004:11) also partly motivate their accounts in terms of the role counterfactuals are given in epistemology. xvii Vacuous truth is not relevant to my discussion of Cogburn and Roland. xviii Why do I not consider such context-sensitive strict conditional accounts of counterfactuals even though they invalidate Conjunction Conditionalization? First, these accounts do not invalidate VW and so an extended discussion of them would be out of place here. Second, although such accounts invalidate Conjunction Conditionalization, they still license instances which are problematic by the lights of those who argue against Conjunction Conditionalization. For instance, in a context in which no other counterfactuals have been asserted, von Fintel's account makes any counterfactual with true components true. Finally, I have argued against such accounts on independent grounds elsewhere (Walters: 2014a) . xix The final version of safe belief that Cogburn and Roland (2013: 260) adopt naturally suggests this semantics, although they don't propose it themselves. xx The following criticisms all apply to the original proposal too. xxi Although Gundersen puts things in terms of normal worlds, his semantics need not appeal to possible worlds at all as (16) and (17) do all the work. xxii One might worry about Gundersen's proposal to distinguish between these conditionals on the following grounds. First, why group true-true counterfactuals with false-false counterfactuals in stating a connection, rather than with semifactuals in denying the opposite connection? Second, whilst people have thought that the truth of the antecedent should not count in favour of a counterfactual being true, they have not traditionally thought that it should count against it being true. But this is what Gundersen effectively does, since he thinks that it is easier for 'if A were the case, C would be the case' to be true when it is a semifactual than when it is a true-true subjunctive: the semifactual only denies the lack of a connection between A and ~C, whereas the latter asserts a connection between A and C. Finally, surely one can be certain that if he had scratched his nose, the coin would (still) have landed heads, regardless of the truth value of the antecedent? Gundersen's treatment does not allow for that. xxiii Although Gundersen's account is flawed, those, like Gundersen, who wish to avoid both Conjunction Conditionalization and Modus Ponens within a possible world semantics, could simply adopt the standard semantics but reject both Strong and Weak Centering. xxiv It is Constraints 1 and 2 that ensure this is the case. xxv Ahmed (2011) , who rejects Substitution and VLAS, explicitly endorses an antecedent-relative closeness ordering. I show (Walters 2011: §3) , however, that Ahmed's reasoning against these principles is invalid given his preferred semantics. The obvious constraint on the closeness ordering which validates Ahmed's reasoning also validates Substitution and VLAS. So with or without this constraint, Ahmed's argument against these principles is unsound. xxvi Compare 3) "the counterfactual constructions of English do carry some sort of presupposition that the antecedent is false. It is some sort of mistake to use them unless the speaker does take the antecedent to be false". xxvii Thanks to three referees for very helpful comments which resulted in a much improved paper. xxviii This proof is in very large part due to a slightly more committal proof of Andrew Bacon's. I am grateful to Andrew for showing me the connection between Disjunction and Disjunction*
